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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY AND
CIVIL POWER IN OHIO
JOHN KULEWICZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
TATE LAW HAS STRUCK AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE between
military and civil power in Ohio. The Strict Subordination clause of
the Ohio Constitution provides, "the military shall be in strict subor-
dination to the civil power."' Nevertheless, the statutes that govern
deployment of the state militia allow commanders of the state's military
forces to eclipse civil power. This article examines the law enforcement
role of the state militia and recommends several measures by which the
General Assembly can implement the constitutionally prescribed rela-
tionship between military and civil power in Ohio.
II. BACKGROUND: PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF THE STRICT
SUBORDINATION CLAUSE
Since the founding of the state, the Strict Subordination clause of the
Ohio Constitution' has defined the relationship of state military forces
to civil government in Ohio. The first state constitution contained the
declaration that "the military shall be kept under strict subordination to
the civil power."3 The clause in its present form' is traceable to the Ohio
Constitution of 1851, which is still in effect.5 The only serious attempt to
alter its current language was a proposal made at the constitutional con-
vention of 1912,' upon which action was not taken.
Although Ohio courts have rarely construed the Strict Subordination
* J.D., Yale University, B.A., Ohio State University.
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4.
2Id.
OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 20.
See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
The Constitutional Convention of 1850, at which the Constitution of 1851
was drafted, adopted the Strict Subordination clause without comment or debate,
and apparently without dissent. See 2 OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES AND PRO-
CEEDINGS 826-31 (1850).
6 The proposal, offered by Mr. Thomas of Cuyahoga County and known as
Proposal No. 3, would have considerably strengthened the language. In its third
section, Proposal No. 3 read in part as follows: "The military shall at all times be
held in strict subordination to the civil authorities. Civil government in this state
shall never be replaced or suspended by martial law." See PROCEEDINGS AND
DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 85, 91, 747,
1404 (1912).
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clause,' certain principles can be deduced from the text of the clause.
The first principle, which arises by implication, stands for the proposi-
tion that the military shall not be superior to the civil government. As
one Ohio court explained, "[t]he military are called out to aid the civil
authority, not to usurp its functions or to take its place. They are ...
subject to the absolute and exclusive control and discretion of the ...
civil officers designated in the statutes."8 This first principle confirms
the ascendancy of civil government over the military.
The second implicit principle of the clause prohibits the existence of
an autonomous military force. Early in the history of the state, the Ohio
Supreme Court recalled the concern of the framers of the Ohio Constitu-
tion that "troops in any degree independent of the civil authority [are]
dangerous to liberty."9 The court reasoned that the militia was merely a
means by which the executive could enforce the laws."0
The language of the Strict Subordination clause forbids either
military or political officials to relocate the decisionmaking power. The
clause provides subordination of the military to civil authorities "shall"
exist in Ohio. Thus, the militia "may exercise none of the functions of
the civil power, nor ... supercede or take the place of the civil power.""
Likewise, a civil government official "may not delegate his authority to
the military force ... or vest in the military any discretionary power." 2
The clause requires rigid observance by both military and civilian of-
ficials and it is only in the absence of civil authority that the military
may unilaterally control the use of armed forces. 3 In addition, the clause
requires that this subordination of the military to civilian authorities be
strictly adhered to." Courts and legislatures normally balance even the
I See State v. Coulter, Wright's Reports 421, 424-27 (1833); State v. Goff,
Wright's Reports 78, 79 (1832); State v. Coit, 8 Ohio Dec. 62, 63 (C.P., Pickaway
County 1897). See also 1 OP. OHIO ATT'Y GEN. 572, 573 (1931); H. WALKER, AN
ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF THE OHIO STATE CONSTITUTION 1851-1951 87 (1951).
' State v. Coit, 8 Ohio Dec. 62, 63 (C.P., Pickaway County 1897).
' State v. Coulter, Wright's Reports 421, 424 (1833) (emphasis in original).
1 Id. See Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 S.W. 484 (1911). "The military can-
not in any state of case take the initiative or assume to do anything independent
of the civil authorities." Id. at 242, 134 S.W. at 488. See also the Declaration of In-
dependence which states that one reason for the colonies' severance from
England was that the king "has affected to render the Military independent of
and superior to the Civil Power."
" State v. Coit, 8 Ohio Dec. 62, 63 (C.P. Pickaway County 1897).
'2 Id. See Ela v. Smith, 71 Mass. 121, 140 (1855) (rendering a like interpreta-
tion of a similar constitutional clause).
1 See Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 200 N.W. 278 (1924). "There can be
no martial law or martial rule, in time of peace, in any place where the civil
authority is acting .... Civil power is supreme while acting and military power is
subordinate thereto." Id. at 309-10, 200 N.W. 280-81. See also Griffith v. Wilcox,
21 Ind. 370 (1863).
" See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
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most absolute of constitutional pronouncements against competing
values,"5 yet the Strict Subordination clause strikes a balance that
weighs heavily in favor of civilian control.
The civil authority to which the constitution subordinates the militia
includes more than just the state government. In Ohio, "the civil power"
consists not only of the state government, but also the county16 and
municipal' governments to which the people have allocated a part of
their sovereignty. The reference of the Strict Subordination clause to
"the civil power", thus must include local governing units. As
repositories of the popular sovereignty, the various levels of govern-
ment in Ohio, so long as they function, together supervise the militia.
The Strict Subordination clause preserves the monopoly that govern-
ment necessarily must hold on the management of force in Ohio. 8
Governments come to power by showing a superior ability to protect
society from external danger and internal instability.19 This includes the
use of force. But only by dominating the use of force in society can a
government maintain its status;2 uncoordinated use of force could
undermine governmental efforts to protect," thereby jeopardizing the
supremacy of the government. The Strict Subordination clause, by pro-
hibiting the existence of an autonomous or superior military in Ohio,"
safeguards the exclusiveness of government's management and
control."
11 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 582-89, 748 (1978) (use of balanc-
ing in speech cases and reapportionment decisions of federal courts).
' OHIO CONST. art. X, § 1.
" OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. See Vaubel, Municipal Corporations and the
Police Power in Ohio, 29 OHIO ST.L.J. 29, 30-36 (1968).
"8 The survival of government by controlling the military is not a recent idea.
See I. RICHARDS, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 154 (2d ed. 1942).
19 See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 12-17, 336-37 (1974).
o Id at 14. See Commonwealth ex rel. Tyler v. Snall, 26 Pa. 31, 33 (1855);
D'Amato, The Limits of Legal Realism, 87 YALE L.J. 468, 469 (1978).
" See R. NOZICK, supra note 19, at 12-13.
" See notes 8-14 supra and accompanying text.
It reflects the significance of the Strict Subordination clause to note that
the constitution of every state except New York declares in some formula of
words closely approximating those used by the Ohio Constitution that the
military shall be subordinate to civil power. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 27; ALASKA
CONST. art. I, § 20; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 20; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 27; CAL. CON-
ST. art. I, § 12; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 22; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 16; DEL. CONST.
art. I, § 17; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 7; GA. CONST. art. I, § 2-205; HAWAII CONST. art.
I, § 14; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 12; ILL. CONST. art. XII, § 2; IND. CONST. art. I, § 33;
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 14; KAN. BILL OF RIGHTS § 4; Ky. CONST. § 22; LA. CONST.
art. XII, § 2; ME. CONST. art. I, § 17; MD. CONST. art. XXX; MASS. CONST. art.
XVIII; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 7; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 14; MISS. CONST. art. III, §
9; MO. CONST. art. I., § 24; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 22; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 17;
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 11; N.H. CONST. art. I, § 24; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 15; N.M.
CONST. art. I, § 9; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 12; OKLA. CONST.
1979]
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III. THE STATE MILITIA: ULTIMATE ENFORCER OF STATE LAWS
The state militia is a standby reserve of citizens upon which the state
government ultimately relies to enforce its laws." State law divides the
militia into two branches: the organized militia and the unorganized
militia.25 The organized militia is at the top of the state's law enforce-
ment hierarchy, and is comprised of the Ohio National Guard, the Ohio
Naval militia, and the Ohio Defense Corps. 6 The unorganized militia in-
cludes nearly every other "able-bodied" Ohio citizen who is between
seventeen and sixty-seven years of age.' When calling out the militia,
art. II, § 14; ORE. CONST. art. I, § 27; PA. CONST. art. I, § 22; R.I. CONST. art. I, §
18; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 16; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 24;
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 24; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 20; VT. CONST. art. I, § 16; VA. CON-
ST. art. I, § 13; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 18; W.VA. CONST. art. III, § 12; WIs. CONST.
art. I, § 20; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 25. See generally A. STURM, NEW STATE CON-
STITUTIONS, LAW AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT S. RANKIN, 165-68 (C.
Beck ed. 1970); Lobb, Civil Authority Versus Military, 3 MINN. L. REV. 105, 105
(1918); Comment, Constitutional and Statutory Bases of Governors' Emergency
Powers, 64 MICH. L. REV. 290, 294 n.19 (1965).
2 The United States Constitution prohibits the states "without the Consent
of Congress [to] keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 10. Fear of the "dangers to the Union from the separate possession of
military forces by the States" prompted the drafters of the federal constitution
to ban standing armies under control of the states. THE FEDERALIST No. 25 (A.
Hamilton) 164 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Accordingly, the Constitution of Ohio
declares that "standing armies, in time of peace .... shall not be kept up." OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 4.
The drafters of the federal constitution, however, contemplated the occasional
need for the states to have control of military forces. THE FEDERALIST No. 25,
supra this note, at 164. Hence, the federal constitution allows Congress to "pro-
vide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 16. When employed in federal service, under the command of the President,
the militia must conform to standards set by Congress. Id. The militia may be
employed in the federal service, however, only "to execute the laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. The
Constitution reserves to the states the power to appoint militia officers, id. at cl.
16, and to govern activities of the militia when the militia is not engaged in
federal service. Id. The Militia Clauses of the United States Constitution thus
represent an accommodation of federal and state government needs. See general-
ly THE FEDERALIST Nos. 8, 25, 26, 27, 29 (A. Hamilton); No. 43 (J. Madison);
Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181 (1940).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5923.01 (Page 1977).
Id.
Id. The Ohio Constitution provides that "[all citizens, residents of this
state, being seventeen years of age, and under the age of sixty-seven years, shall
be subject to enrollment in the militia and the performance of military duty, in
such manner, not incompatible with the Constitution and laws of the United
States, as may be prescribed by law." OHIO CONST. art. IX, § 1. Pursuant to the
constitution, the revised code has exempted the following persons from member-
ship in the militia: 1) citizens who are not "able-bodied," OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5923.01 (Page 1977); 2) officials of all three branches of the state government, and
[Vol. 28:611
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the governor is required by law to order members of the organized
militia into service before summoning the unorganized militia.28
Ordinarily, Ohio National Guard units perform the law enforcement
duties of the organized militia. The National Guard is a quasi-federal
organization created by Congress to act as a reserve for the regular
armed forces of the nation.' Congress has allocated funds to each state
for the recruitment, training, and discipline of a National Guard. 0 When
necessary, the President of the United States can order the Guard into
federal service." When not enrolled in federal service, the National
executive and judicial officers of the United States government, id. § 5923.02; and
3) Ohioans who conscientiously hold religious beliefs that interdict military ser-
vice. The latter may claim exemption only from combatant responsibilities. Id.
Standards for exemption from militia service for religious reasons are the same
as those prescribed by the United States Department of Defense for "conscien-
tious objectors." Conscientious Objectors, 32 C.F.R. § 75.5 (1978). All other
citizens of Ohio between the ages of seventeen and sixty-seven are, by law,
members of the state militia.
2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5923.21 (Page 1977). Ohio law implicitly rejects the
possibility that the unorganized militia will ever be activated. No provision is
made for organizing the unorganized militia in the event of necessity. Cf. LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 29.6 (West 1975) (setting forth the organizing powers of the
governor); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 37-A, § 209 (1964) (providing for training of
unorganized militia and for determining exactly who shall be in the organized
militia; MISS. CODE ANN. § 33-5-13 (1972) (providing for draft of unorganized
militia); NEB. REV. STAT. § 55-118 (1978) (draft of unorganized militia to be appor-
tioned equitably among the counties); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 110-a:4 (1977)
(establishing priority of classes in draft of unorganized militia).
Several states are more clear than Ohio in specifying who is "able-bodied."
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 48-102 (1976) ("incapacitated persons, mentally ill persons,
and persons convicted of infamous crimes" are exempt from militia duty). Other
states have provided for parental consent procedures to allow younger citizens
who are ineligible for service, yet eager to serve in the militia, to do so. See, e.g.,
IDAHO CODE § 46-102 (1977); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 33, § 2 (Michie/Law Co-op
1973).
- 32 U.S.C. §§ 101-715 (1976). See generally M. DERTHIK, THE NATIONAL
GUARD IN POLITICS (1965); J. ELLIOTT, THE MODERN ARMY AND AIR NATIONAL
GUARD (1965); W. RIKER, THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY: SOLDIERS OF THE STATES (1957). For a history of the Ohio National
Guard, see OHIO ADJUTANT GENERAL'S DEP'T, THE BUCKEYE GUARD and E.
GRANT & M. HILL, I WAS THERE 133-36 (1974).
'8 Total federal funds spent in Ohio during the fiscal year 1978 in direct sup-
port of the Ohio National Guard equalled $81,647,025. ADJUTANT GENERAL OF
OHIO, ANNUAL REPORT viii (1978) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT). The
State of Ohio provided $6,612,105. Id. Congress has created and funded the Na-
tional Guard pursuant to Article I, section 8, clause 16 of the United States Con-
stitution. See note 24 supra.
"' 10 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332 (1975). The state-federal shared nature of the National
Guard was especially evident at the time of the Little Rock, Arkansas public
school desegregation crisis. Originally, Governor Orval Faubus used the Arkan-
sas National Guard units at his command to prevent the court ordered entrance
of black students into Central High School. President Eisenhower upstaged
19791
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Guard is a state force under the control of the governor. 32
IV. LOCAL CONTROL OF THE USE OF FORCE
The state government has delegated much of its monopoly on the use
of force to various units of local government. These units include: the
county, which is the focal unit of the state's distribution of law enforce-
ment power; the cities and villages, which have incorporated parts of
each county;3 and the townships, the unincorporated territory that re-
mains." State law confers responsibilities upon a particular officeholder
in each jurisdiction to manage the use of force.
A. Functions and Duties of the Local Officials
The sheriff, elected quadrennially by the voters, is the chief law en-
forcement officer of each county. At the sheriff's command are deputy
sheriffs appointed by the sheriff." In addition, the sheriff may "call to
Faubus by federalizing the Arkansas National Guard and using the same troops
to enforce the federal court desegregation order. See 41 Ops. ARK. ATT'Y GEN.
313 (1957).
1 The potential strength of the Ohio National Guard far exceeds that of the
Ohio State Highway Patrol. The Ohio National Guard consists of the Army Na-
tional Guard, the Air National Guard, and its own reserve force. Currently 11,993
officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel are enrolled in the Army Na-
tional Guard. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 30, at 1. A total of 5,229 officers and
airmen compose the Air National Guard. Id. at 45.
When the President has federalized the National Guard, the Ohio Defense
Corps assumes the Guard's responsibilities. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5920.01
(Page 1977). There are forty-eight active Defense Corps units located in various
cities throughout the state. The Defense Corps is divided into four infantry
brigades, a military police batallion, and a band, to which 483 officers, warrant of-
ficers, and enlisted members belong. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 30, at 57.
In practice, the capability of the Guard to control domestic unrest may not be
as effective as the numbers suggest. The Ohio National Guard has designated six-
teen of its units as "Civil Disturbance Mission Units." The Guard has equipped
these units, trained according to United States Army standards, with a diverse
array of civil disorder gear. See Ohio Adjutant General's Department, Training
and Evaluation of Forces for Civil Disturbances, AGO REGULATION No. 350-1 (Ar-
my). Yet, local officials normally must anticipate a six to eight hour delay after
gubernatorial authorization before the National Guard is able to commit a signifi-
cant number of these units to the disorder. See OHIO ADJUTANT GENERAL'S
DEP'T, EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR LOCAL AUTHORITIES SEEKING STATE
ASSISTANCE IN EMERGENCIES B-2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as EMERGENCY PRO-
CEDURES]. Additionally, if disorders in Ohio require the presence of other units,
the Guard may be completely unable to respond. Fully 75.4% of the Ohio Na-
tional Guard's units are unprepared or only marginally ready to perform their
mission. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 30, at 9-10.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 703.01 (Page 1979).
Id. § 503.01.
Id. § 311.01.
Id. § 311.04.
[Vol. 28:611
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his aid such persons or power of the county as is necessary '3 7 to allow
him to maintain order.
Within the incorporated cities of each county, the mayor bears gen-
eral responsibility for law enforcement.' The state has authorized cities
to create their own police departments and auxiliary police forces'" to
aid the mayor's law enforcement efforts. Under the administrative aegis
of the city director of public safety,4' each municipal police force con-
sists of a chief of police and the officers, patrolmen, and other employees
for whom the city council provides.'" The mayor may appoint additional
officers and patrolmen to serve temporarily during a riot.3
Likewise, the mayor, elected by the citizens of each village, also bears
responsibility for law enforcement within village boundaries." As "chief
conservator of the peace,"'5 the village mayor names a marshall, and
may select a deputy marshall, policemen, night watchmen, and special
policemen for the village.' It is the statutory duty of the marshall to
"suppress all riots, disturbances and breaches of the peace."'" In fulfill-
ing his obligations, the marshall may also summon village citizens to his
aid. 8
In the townships of each county, the constable, designated by the
board of township trustees,'9 performs the law enforcement functions.
The constable, like a village marshall, has the duty to "suppress riots,
and keep and preserve the peace within the county."'3
In order to maintain decentralized management of external force,
state law attempts to integrate local law enforcement efforts. If riot, in-
surrection, or invasion overtaxes his or her forces, a sheriff may seek
assistance from the sheriffs of adjoining counties and from the mayors
and chairpersons of the board of township trustees in the same and ad-
jacent counties.5' Similarly, the mayor of an incorporated city, in the
event of riot or other emergency, may demand aid from the sheriff,
37 Id. § 311.07(A).
Id. § 733.03.
Id. § 737.05.
Id. § 737.051.
" Id. § 737.02.
42 Id. § 737.05.
- Id. § 737.10.
" Id. § 733.30.
.5 Id. § 733.24.
46 Id. §§ 737.15-.16.
. Id. § 737.19(C).
" Id.
49 Id. § 509.01.
" Id. § 509.05.
Id. § 311.07.
19791
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mayors, and trustees' chairpersons of the same and adjoining counties.2
Township constables and village marshalls may call the county sheriff
or deputy sheriffs to their aid in "state cases."53 In each case, the
neighboring official must supply whatever added force is necessary to
allow the overburdened sheriff or mayor to carry out his or her duties.'
Only when the loss of such forces would jeopardize police protection
within his or her own jurisdiction may a neighboring official deny the
request.55
The state's reliance on a localized structure for the management of
force is a sound policy. 8 The people of Ohio have accorded sovereignty
to county and local governments, 7 it would minimize the effectiveness
of home rule to deny to these units of government the authority to
preserve order. In addition, local authorities are generally best suited to
appraise the context in which disorders arise. Indeed, political and ad-
ministrative experience within the community intimately acquaints
elected local officials with the rights and expectations of the residents.
With presumed knowledge of the causes of disorder and the urgency of
the unrest, local authorities are better equipped to enforce laws with
the least expense of lives, property, and liberty.
Local control of force also maintains community values. The primary
concern of remote military and political authorities is to enforce a law.
Thus local values are generally of minimal importance. Military com-
manders need not worry about securing the approval of the community
either before acting or in the aftermath of the deployment of force. The
same holds true for the governor, for adverse local political reaction will
have minimal effect so long as a majority of voters elsewhere in the
state support his actions. Local authorities, on the other hand, normally
must live and continue to seek office in the affected community. The
prospect of an upcoming election could encourage a local official to
refrain from transgressing community mores, and instead enforce the
law in a manner that will conform to community standards. Predomi-
nant reliance on local officials thus makes possible a more sensitive use
of force.5" The same considerations support the state's formal reliance
- Id. § 737.10.
- Id. § 509.06.
- Id. §§ 311.07(B), 737.10.
55 Id.
See generally Aumann, The Ohio Law Enforcement System, 21 U. CINN. L.
REV. 1, 24-30 (1952). Although the governor may institute judicial proceedings to
oust local officials who refuse or willfully neglect to enforce the law, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 3.07-.08 (Page 1978), local officials are accountable only to the
citizens within their jurisdictions.
s See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
This concept of decentralized autonomy is affected by internal problems.
First, conflicts of authority may occur between the county sheriff and municipal
or township officials when disturbances occur within the political subdivisions of
[Vol. 28:611
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on local civil authorities to manage the state forces that come to their
aid.'9
B. Deployment of the State Militia
The state maintains a reservoir of two forces: the Ohio State Highway
Patrol and the state militia. Beleaguered local officials may call upon the
governor for assistance from these agencies. State law provides that the
Highway Patrol and militia units dispatched by the governor shall,
under most circumstances, act in aid of local authorites."
Local authorities must request Highway Patrol assistance before the
governor can dispatch the troopers."1 When and if the governor provides
Patrol assistance,82 the Patrol supplements the forces of the local
authorities. 3 Troopers remain under the direct control of the superin-
tendent and his field commander at the scene of the disturbance." These
officials are responsible for coordinating the troopers' activities with
the needs of the local officials.
the county. It is likely, however, that the sheriff in such cases will conserve his
scarce resources until the mayor or township officials invite his assistance.
Secondly, where community values condone local exercise of what state of-
ficials would regard as excessive force, the parochiality of the concept of decen-
tralized autonomy may work to the disadvantage of participants in local civil
disorders. Despite this problem, state control itself cannot be said to be superior
to local control of the militia.
" See notes 35-55 supra and accompanying text.
6 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5923.22 (Page 1977).
61 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5503.02(B) (Page Supp. 1979). The mayor has ex-
clusive authority to initiate requests for Patrol assistance in cities in which the
sheriff does not provide exclusive police services under contract. In cities in
which the sheriff does provide exclusive police services and in villages and unin-
corporated areas of a county, it is the sheriff who has authority to make requests
for Patrol aid. Id. When making the request for Patrol assistance, the requesting
official must notify the law enforcement authorities in contiguous communities
and the sheriffs of each county in the troubled area. Id.
62 Under current procedures the governor will dispatch the Patrol to civil
disorder duty only when unrest has exceeded or is about to exceed the control of
local authorities "operating at their maximum capability." EMERGENCY
PROCEDURES, supra note 32, at 3-1.
6Id.
6Id.
,5 Id. The Patrol is trained to engage in civil disorder control. Civil disorder
control, though, is a secondary task of the Highway Patrol. Normally the Patrol,
under the supervision of the Superintendent and the Director of the Department
of Highway Safety, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5503.01 (Page Supp. 1979), enforces
state vehicle and highway laws throughout Ohio. Id. § 5503.02(A). In addition, the
Patrol enforces the criminal laws on state property. Id. When riots, civil
disorders, or insurrections occur or impend state law authorizes use of the Patrol
to enforce criminal laws within the entire affected area. Id. § 5503.02(B). Every
trooper has undergone at least fifty hours of special civil disturbance instruction
during basic training. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES, supra note 32, at B-i; Letter
19791
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When circumstances have engrossed the resources of all local forces
and the Highway Patrol, the governor will entertain requests by local
authorities for militia assistance." In contrast to the procedure for re-
questing the Highway Patrol, the governor need not await a request by
local officials before he deploys the militia. 7 Use of the militia is entirely
a matter of the governor's discretion subject only to limited judicial
review. 8 After the governor commits the militia to a scene, the heads of
the Highway Patrol and state militia mutually agree on a schedule to
phase out the Patrol's participation.6 Thereafter, the militia acts at the
behest of local officials.
If "any breakdown of law and order impends,"7 ° the governor may
assume personal control of law enforcement in the affected area.
Whether the need for such gubernatorial involvement exists is again,
generally a matter of the governor's discretion. 1 If the governor so
determines, he may issue a proclamation announcing his assumption of
control. 2 Under command of the governor, rather than local officials, the
from Col. Adam G. Reiss, Superintendent, Ohio Highway Patrol, to John
Kulewicz (Mar. 20, 1979) (on file with author) [hereinafter cited as Reiss letter]. In
addition, each trooper annually attends two seminars on control of civil disorders.
Id. In less than one hour the Patrol, operating from eleven headquarters located
throughout the state, allegedly is capable of gathering 175 troopers at the site of
a civil disorder. Id. The Patrol can place its total force of nearly 1110 on "im-
mediate response alert" if the disorder is anticipated. Id.
" EMERGENCY PROCEDURES, supra note 32, at 4-1. In general, local authorities
are expected to request assistance from the Highway Patrol before seeking the
aid of the state militia. Id. at 1-1. See generally, Aumann, supra note 56, at 6-9.
6 See OHIO CONST. art. IX, § 4; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5923.21 (Page 1977).
" See note 71 infra.
69 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES, supra note 32, at 1-1.
70 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5923.231 (Page 1977).
71 The Court has repeatedly asserted that the actions taken by a governor
after issuing a martial rule proclamation are subject to limited judicial review.
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248-49 (1974); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1,
14-16 (1972). These cases repudiate the notion, enunciated in Moyer v. Peabody,
212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909), that the actions of a governor during a time of martial law
were unreviewable. Instead, courts will examine a governor's martial law actions
to discern whether "the exertion of state power has overridden private rights
secured by the Constitution." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 249, quoting Ster-
ling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 398 (1932). See also E. BECKWITH, LAWFUL AC-
TION OF STATE MILITARY FORCES 45-47 (1944); J. BISHOP, JUSTICE UNDER FIRE
236-51 (1974); R. RANKIN, WHEN CIVIL LAW FAILS 159-72 (1939); F. WEINER, A
PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW 16-27 (1940); Mutter, Some Observations
on Military Involvement in Domestic Disorder, 29 FED. B.J. 59, 62 (1969); Note,
Martial Law and the National Guard, 18 N.Y.L.F. 216, 219-29 (1972); Note,
Preserving Order in the State: A Traditional Reappraisal, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 143,
158-59 (1972); Comment, The Power of a Governor to Proclaim Martial Law and
Use State Military Forces to Suppress Campus Demonstrations, 59 KY. L.J. 547,
558-69 (1970); Comment, 42 So. CAL. L. REV. 546, 550-55 (1969).
72 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5923.231 (Page 1977).
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militia thereafter would execute the law and keep the peace in the
designated area.
A state of qualified martial law exists after the governor has assumed
control of local peacekeeping efforts.4 Ohio statutes do not allow the use
of full-fledged martial law under which a military commander estab-
lishes military courts to try offenses under whatever rules he might
issue." The present statutory provision for qualified martial law70 gives
the militia no power to issue directives and prosecute violators. Instead,
the militia is limited to executing the laws and keeping the peace within
an affected area.77 Militia authorities eventually must deliver any
73 Id.
71 See R. RANKIN, supra note 71.
Whenever disorders have occurred and the use of troops has become
necessary, there have been three distinct classifications in which the
soldiers might find themselves: 1) when the militia has been called out
for the purpose of aiding the civil authorities, martial law has not been
declared and the troops have simply acted as peace officers; 2) when
qualified martial law has been declared, either the soldiers have turned
offenders over to the civil courts for trial or have kept them in detention
until the restoration of peace; and 3) when punitive martial law has been
declared and the military commander has been permitted to establish
military courts for the trial of offenders against whatever rules that
might be established, the troops have been limited only by the orders of
superior officers.
Id. at 146. See generally C. FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE 99 (2d ed.
1943); U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, CIVIL DISTURBANCES AND DISORDERS 3-3, G-1
-G-14 (1968); U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, LECTURERS ON MARTIAL LAW (1960); F.
WEINER, supra note 71, at 6-15; Fairman, Martial Rule and the Suppression of In-
surrection, 23 ILL. L. REV. 766, 775 (1929).
75 "Martial law" is not identical to "martial rule." Disagreement exists over
exactly what each term means. See F. WEINER, supra note 71, at 9-10; Fairman,
supra note 74 at 775. This paper adopts the following definition: "martial law,"
for which the Ohio statutory scheme provides, is characterized by military
replacement of civil authorities in the administration and enforcement of civil
government laws. By contrast, "martial rule," for which Ohio law makes no provi-
sion, is characterized by military dictation of ad hoc rules and regulations. But
see National Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 501.4 (1978) (reversing the meaning of the
terms). The Adjutant General of Ohio observes the federal procedures for the ex-
ecution of the state militia's martial law responsibilities. ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 30.
76 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5923.231 (Page 1977).
'7 Id. The statute requires the governor to designate the area in which the
militia is to act, but fails to confine militia units to operating within the bound-
aries of the state, or to provide for circumstances under which the militia may
cross into other states. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 190.025 (West 1962) (state
militia under direction of the governor and officer in immediate command may
continue in "fresh pursuit" of insurrectionists, saboteurs, enemies, or enemy
forces beyond the borders of the state into another state until the fugitives are
captured or forces of the other state or of the United States have had reasonable
opportunity to take up the pursuit; provided, that the appropriate official in the
other state has authorized the pursuit); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 38 A:16-1 (West 1968).
Nor does the revised code define the circumstances under which militia units
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civilian whom they arrest or detain to the proper civil authorities."8
Local officials may continue to participate in law enforcement efforts,
but only under the auspices of the governor. The significance is that
martial law in Ohio thus shifts to remote civil officials the responsibility
for directing law enforcement activities, activities traditionally per-
formed by local officials."9
V. THE AUTONOMY OF THE STATE MILITIA
Contrary to the described statutory scheme, ° four statutory short-
comings allow the militia to become a self-directing force when dispatched
by the governor to aid local officials. Under the militia deployment law,
local civil authorities have absolutely no control over militia tactics." In
addition, members of the militia are not held by law to the same stan-
dard of tort liability to which other law enforcement personnel are sub-
ject. 2 Recalcitrant military commanders can take advantage of ambig-
uities in the martial law statute to seize the policymaking initiative
operating in the service of other states may enter Ohio, or provide a means by
which the state government may authorize or forbid the entrance. See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 86-117 (1979) (fresh pursuit); IDAHO CODE § 46-110 (1977) (only gover-
nor authorized to give permission); S.C. CODE § 25-1-90 (1977) (same provisions).
78 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5923.231 (Page 1977).
As a last resort, the state may call upon the United States government to
send federal troops and militia units of other states to Ohio for the purpose of
restoring order. The United States Constitution provides that "[t]he United
States shall ... protect each [state] against domestic Violence," U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 4, upon application of the legislature or, when the legislature cannot be con-
vened, of the chief executive of the affected state. Pursuant to this Guarantee
Clause, Congress has provided for federal military aid to beleaguered state
governments. 10 U.S.C. § 331 (1976). Statutes also provide for presidential use of
militia and armed forces to enforce federal law, id. § 332, or to prevent in-
terference with state and federal law, id. § 333. In addition, the president is re-
quired, before using federal troops domestically, to issue a proclamation that
orders the "insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a
limited time." id. § 334. See Note, Riot Control and the Use of Federal Troops, 81
HARV. L. REV. 638 (1968).
The constitutional authority of the president to act on his own initiative to ex-
ecute the laws may exceed the limits of these statutes. See 41 Ops. ARK. ATT'Y
GEN. 313 (1957) (indicating "grave doubts as to the authority of the Congress to
limit the constitutional powers of the President to enforce the laws and preserve
the peace under circumstances which he deems appropriate"). Similar doubts,
founded on the separation of powers concept, may also apply to the constitutional
authority of a state legislature to define the limits of gubernatorial power to use
the state militia. See Woodbridge, A History of Separation of Powers in Ohio, 13
U. CINN. L. REV. 191, 240-42 (1939); Comment, Martial Law, 42 So. CAL. L. REV.
546, 556 n.59 (1969).
See notes 60-79 supra and accompanying text.
81 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5923.23 (Page 1977).
Id. § 5923.37.
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from local officials. State law prevents civilians from attaining militia
leadership positions. 3 A final, non-statutory shortcoming derives from
the current civil disorder control policies of the governor's office. The
emergency procedures used by the governor's office allow a militia com-
mander, rather than a civilian official, to control coordinating efforts at
the command post established at the site of militia interventions. 4
The infirmity of civilian authority results in part from the statutory
restriction on local civil control of militia tactics. When the governor
sends militia units to the aid of a local government, the civil authorities
may only "designate in general terms" what they want the militia to
do.85 Currently, the state suggests that local officials merely specify that
they want the militia to "provide assistance to the Police of this city to
aid in restoring and maintaining law and order."" State law provides
that after the civilian official has stated the mission of the militia, "[t]he
mode and means of execution shall be left to the discretion of the com-
manding officer."87 Local civil authorities, thus, do not have power to
control the tactics of the militia.
By withdrawing from civilian officials the power to control tactics, the
statute reduces civil authority over the militia to a mere momentary
nexus. On a university campus, for example, the university president
normally retains primary responsibility for preserving order. The presi-
dent may direct the militia to secure a campus building, yet it is the
military commander, not the university president, who determines
whether and to what degree force shall be used.8"
Civil preeminence is not guaranteed simply because the governor re-
tains his power over the militia as commander-in-chief. The governor
has no statutory authority over the militia after sending in units to aid
local governments. 9 Only by declaring a state of martial law, due to the
"breakdown of law and order,"9 does the governor assume actual com-
mand of militia efforts. Statutory restriction of local civil power over
militia tactics thus provides the militia a wide-ranging license to act in-
dependently in its own pursuit of law and order.
If the militia were subject to the same standard of liability as local
law enforcement officers, the virtual displacement of formal civil
authority might not be as flagrant. At least the militia would have to
Id. §§ 5913.021-.06.
14 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES, supra note 32, at 1-1.
SOHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5923.23 (Page 1977).
86 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES, supra note 32, at D-1.
8 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5923.23 (Page 1977).
Id. See Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972).
" OHIo REV. CODE ANN § 5923.231 (Page 1977). This statute allows the gover-
nor to issue a proclamation ordering cessation of the duties given to the militia,
but does not give the governor control over the militia during the interim period.
90 Id.
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observe the limits that the courts have imposed on the conduct of
regular law enforcement officers under the control of civil authorities.
Yet, an indulgent statute91 has freed the militia from even this degree of
deference to local civil power.
Militia members operate within a much looser standard of liability
than regular police officers. Generally, police officers incur personal
liability for negligent or wrongful acts that cause personal injury or
death.92 Members of the organized militia, however, are not answerable
in a civil suit for any military act they perform, unless the act is one of
willful or wanton misconduct.93 Thus, in the gap between negligence and
willful or wanton misconduct, the militia is immune from accountability
to any civil authority, including the courts.
The statutory procedure for invoking martial law further reduces the
effectiveness of local civil authority. The martial law procedure
paradoxically places on local officials the burden of cooperating with the
militia commander in defining the mission of the militia units." If the
military commander and the civil official disagree over the proper goals
for the militia to pursue, the frustrated commander can plead to the
governor that conditions are ripe for a "breakdown of law and order."
The governor then has it within his discretion to declare martial law.
Nowhere does the martial law statute define the meaning of a
"breakdown of law and order."95 Moreover, the governor may complete
the transfer of enforcement power even before the "breakdown"
occurs.96  Indeed, the governor can severly restrict standing local
governments. Having sent the state militia into a situation, the gover-
nor has a strong incentive to promote maximum efficiency by removing
whatever local obstacles exist which could impede the militia. It thus
behooves local civilian officials to accede to the wishes of military com-
manders.
By law, the person who shapes militia policy must be a veteran
91 Id. § 5923.37.
See Cusack v. McGrain, 136 Ohio St. 27, 23 N.E.2d 633 (1939); American
Guarantee Co. v. McNiece, 111 Ohio St. 532, 146 N.E. 77 (1924). See also Annot.,
60 A.L.R. 2d 873, 882 (1958).
9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5923.37 (Page 1977). Moreover, any civil proceeding
alleging an act of wanton or willful misconduct performed by a member of the
organized militia in the line of duty must be brought within two years after per-
formance of the alleged act. Id. § 5923.36.
- Id. § 5923.23.
95 Id. § 5923.231.
" Id. The judiciary, of course, has asserted its authority to review the actions
taken by a governor after he or she has instituted martial law. See note 71 supra.
In reviewing the governor's response to an emergency, the courts will question
whether there was a "direct relation" between the actions taken and the goal of
restoring order. Note, Preserving Order in the State: A Traditional Reappraisal,
supra note 71, at 159.
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military officer. At the policymaking and administrative head of the
organized militia is the Adjutant General of Ohio.97 The Adjutant
General is subject only to the direct authority of the governor. 8 The
governor must select the Adjutant General from the pool of federally
recognized officers of the Ohio National Guard," who have served more
than five years as a commissioned Guard officer and who have attained
at least the rank of colonel."' The militia, thus, is a self-contained in-
stitution, impervious to ongoing civilian influence except at the ex of-
ficio gubernatorial level.
The militia further overrides civil authority at the command post
established by the governor at the scene of each militia intervention. At
the command post are representatives of affected local law enforcement
agencies, the militia, and the Highway Patrol.' Each representative has
authority to act for his agency.'2 Yet, under wider current command
post procedures, it is the National Guard Task Force Commander, not a
local civilian official, who coordinates the joint efforts of all forces. 103
Specific missions are assigned by consensus of all parties involved; the
local civil authorities have influence only in direct proportion to their
presence at the command post."' This procedure for the distribution of
power at the command post further evinces the militia's dominant role.
VI. SUBORDINATING THE MILITIA: A PROPOSAL FOR
STATUTORY REFORM
To effectuate the Strict Subordination clause, the law must recognize
more clearly the surrogate role of the state militia in Ohio law enforce-
ment. As a first step towards reform, local officials should be given
statutory authority to control the tactics of the militia units sent to
their aid. Local civil authorities, of course, do not constantly make such
decisions for their own police departments, yet, no statute precludes
them from so doing. It is especially urgent in the highly-charged at-
mosphere that usually surrounds militia interventions that officials who
9' OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5913.01 (Page 1977). The Adjutant General also is
chief-of-staff to the governor. Id. Along with the Adjutant General, the military
staff of the governor consists of an assistant adjutant general for the army, an
assistant adjutant general for air, an assistant quartermaster general, and four
aides-de-camp. Id. § 5913.02. Like the Adjutant General, these persons hold office
at the pleasure of the governor, and must be active officers of the Ohio National
Guard at the time of their appointment. Id. §§ 5913.021-.06.
Id. § 5913.01.
Id. § 5913.021.
100 Id.
'01 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES, supra note 32, at 1-1.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
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are attuned to local conditions and non-military values be able to control
the use of force. Local officials, moreover, can coordinate the operations
of militia units with the local police departments. Such reform could
make it vitally important for local officials to understand the capabil-
ities of the militia.
The militia also should operate under the same standard of liability
that governs regular local forces."5 To be sure, the disorders that militia
units seek to control are normally more furious than the situations en-
countered by police forces. The increased magnitude of violence would at
first seem to justify the broader scope of permissible militia conduct,
however the presence of the militia compensates for the greater intens-
ity of lawlessness. In the absence of other reasons justifying reduced
liability, militia members in the performance of their duties should incur
liability for any negligent or wrongful acts."6
To ensure the efficacy of civil power, the conditions under which the
governor may declare martial law also should be clarified. The ill-
defined and expansive provision for martial law under present Ohio law
can put local authorities at a disadvantage in dealing with strong-willed
militia commanders. It would strengthen the resolve of local officials if
the martial law statute clearly delineated what constituted a "break-
down of law and order," and limited gubernatorial proclamations to such
occasions. Ideally, a "breakdown" would consist only of the complete
routing of local authorities. In no other situation is there a conspicuous
need for gubernatorial control.
In addition, the Adjutant General of Ohio should come from the
civilian population. Like the Secretary of Defense of the United States,
the Adjutant General coordinates defense operations and serves as
liason between military forces and a civilian chief executive. Both the
Defense Secretary and the Adjutant General function as administrative
and policymaking heads of defense forces; they act as advocates of
military power to their respective chief executives. Yet, in contrast to
the Secretary of Defense, who may never have served as a commissioned
officer in the regular military for at least ten years prior to his appoint-
'o' See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
1 See Engdahl, A Comprehensive Study of the Use of Military Troops in
Civil Disorders, 43 COLO. L. REV. 399 (1972); Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots, and
Revolutions: The Law and History of Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA
L. REV. 1 (1971). Engdahl argues that so long as civilian institutions are capable
of functioning, military personnel may be utilized to deal with civilians only as a
supplemental civilian force. The militia personnel should be completely under the
control and discretion of local civilian officials, subject to the rules and restraints
of civilian law, and neither bound nor protected by the rules of military law.
Engdahl's argument supports not only the proposal for an identical liability stan-
dard for police officers and militia members, but also the recommendation
presented herein regarding civilian control of militia tactics, and the arrange-
ment of power at the command posts.
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ment, °7 the Adjutant General of Ohio must possess current military
credentials."8 Installation of a civilian as chief policymaker of the state
militia would infuse civilian considerations directly into militia ac-
tivities.' 9 Institution of direct civilian control of the organized militia
would reinforce the constitutional commitment to civil authority.
The state should also recognize the paramount authority of civilian of-
ficials at the command post. Current command post procedures give ex-
cessive power to militia and Highway Patrol chiefs. " Rather than re-
taining control of operations, these non-civilians should act as advisors
to the decisionmaking heads of affected civil governments. The direc-
tives of local civil officials, not a joint agreement of all parties at the
command post, should assign missions. Likewise, a civil official should
coordinate command post activities. Rearranged in this manner, the
command post would reflect the constitutional ranking of authority.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Ohio General Assembly should act at once to correct the inverted
relationship between military and civil power in Ohio. So long as the militia
deployment statutes remain as they are, militia commanders are free to
override civil authority. The prospect of civil subordination to the
military is repugnant not only to the principles of the Ohio Constitution,
but also to the values of our democratic society.
107 10 U.S.C. § 133(a) (1976).
108 See notes 97-100 supra and accompanying text.
109 Not every state requires that its Adjutant General come from the military.
See ALASKA STAT. § 26.05.160 (1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-2-2-7 (Burns 1972); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 363. But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 127A-19 (Cum. Supp. 1977)
(adjutant general of military background is head of militia and serves at the
pleasure of the governor); S.C. CODE § 25-1-320 (1976) (adjutant general chosen at
statewide election).
"' See notes 101-104 supra and accompanying text.
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